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MERGER ACCOUNTING

It is no news to anyone in this audience that

American business has been growing rapidly in recent years,
and that growth brings change.
The need to keep corporate financial reporting

abreast of changing business conditions has been commented

on widely.
Reliable and understandable corporate information

is the concern of corporate management, financial analysts,

the accounting profession, credit-granting institutions,
27-million private investors, and institutional investors.

Indeed, the health of the economy is dependent upon it.
Three basic groups are involved with improved

corporate financial reporting.

First, there are the man

agements who bear the responsibility for regular public
disclosure of their stewardship.

They essentially are

the producers of financial information.

On the other

or receiving end are the consumers of such information
-- the investors and the credit-grantors.

In the middle

is the accounting profession, represented by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

In this mixture, the accountants have become the
catalyst for the creation of feasible and realistic account

ing standards and principles.

And their role in setting

standards has taken on added significance to a large extent

because of the increasing demands of investors.
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Investors today are more numerous and more

knowledgeable than they have been in the past.

They

insist on financial information that is more comprehen

sive and more consistent than American business is
accustomed to giving.
The needs and demands of investors have brought

a new urgency to bear on the accounting profession’s role
as standard-setter.

This role has come to the accounting

profession through a process of natural evolution.

Public

accounting grew out of the need to provide confidence in
the reliability of financial statements.
In filling the need, the profession has established

accounting and auditing standards.

It also has provided

a code of professional ethics which requires its members
to adhere to these standards and to be intellectually and

financially independent of its business clients.

The American Institute of CPAs has had a major
part in the development of technical and ethical standards

over the years.

The establishment and improvement of

these standards began early in this century.

As the public

need for financial information grew, the accounting pro

fession recognized its increasing responsibility to the
public.

Today the issuance of authoritative pronounce
ments on accounting principles is the responsibility of
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the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute.
As an institution in the private sector, the Accounting

Principles Board does not have the power of an agency of
the government.

Like other professional organizations,

its power rests on its special expertness and its perform
ance.

However, the governing Council of the AICPA
requires all members of the Institute to note in financial
statements of companies which they audit any departure from

an Opinion of the Accounting Principles Board.

Also, the

Securities and Exchange Commission requires that financial
statements of corporations within its jurisdiction be
audited by independent accountants and the SEC usually

backs up the pronouncements of the Board by requiring

companies to follow them.

In addition, stock exchanges require that listed

companies publish audited financial statements.

Ordinarily

the exchanges will not permit companies to use accounting

principles to which the auditors take exception.
Major objectives of the Accounting Principles

Board are to improve accounting and reporting standards
and to remove unnecessary alternative accounting practices.
The existence of such alternatives can make it difficult

to compare financial statements of different companies.
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Members of the Accounting Principles Board are

appointed by the President of the American Institute with

approval of the Board of Directors.

They are chosen on

the basis of their ability as leaders in the field of

accounting thought.
Currently serving are fourteen CPAs in public

practice, two professors of accounting, and two financial
executives in industry.

This is not an ivory tower group.

They are very much in touch with the realities of the

business world.

It is a group of very able and thoughtful

men who are striving to reach agreement in areas where

there are strong controversies and valid differences in
points of view.

APB members devote a great amount of time to
the Board’s work, and many of them are aided by several

of their partners and staff.

Their work is voluntary --

neither the American Institute of CPAs nor the government

could hire talent of this caliber for the job.
The procedures for issuing APB Opinions are

designed to assure that all points of view are given con

sideration.
an

Ordinarily, the first step in developing

Opinion is a research study of the subject.

The re

sults are published and circulated to knowledgeable people
for comment.

-5A committee of the Board is then appointed to
consider the subject.

This committee develops points for

debate by the full Board and later prepares a draft of an

Opinion.

In the course of its preparation, consultations

usually are held with key groups in the business community,

including those from industries which will be most affected
by the proposed Opinion.
The draft is then considered further by the entire

Board.

When the Board is satisfied that it covers the

subject properly, the draft is printed and thousands of

copies are exposed for comment to leading accountants, fi
nancial executives in industry, government agencies, and

stock exchanges.

Large numbers of comments are received

(up to 1,000 in one case) and each member of the Board

receives a copy of every letter of comment.
Redrafting usually follows in light of the com
ments.

Finally the Board votes on the matter and, if the

Opinion receives an affirmative two-thirds, it is issued.
Since its formation in 1959, the APB has made
considerable progress toward codifying generally accepted

principles and reducing unwarranted differences in account

ing practice.
Certainly, the merger movement has been the business

phenomenon of the 1960s; some have described it as a business

revolution.

While mergers are not new in American business
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history, the current movement contains novel features of

such a nature as to present serious problems in accounting.
These features have created situations in which

financial statements were inadequate or potentially mis
leading to investors.

Two of the most pressing were

reporting earnings per share when a variety of complex
securities were involved in a merger, and accounting for

business combinations and goodwill.
The Accounting Principles Board of the American

Institute of CPAs dealt with the former -- earnings per

share -- in two steps.

One was the issuance of APB Opinion

9 in 1966 and the other was Opinion 15, issued in May, 1969.

These Opinions apply to all companies, although

their impact was felt particularly by those conglomerates

that made their acquisitions through the use of complex
securities.

Before these Opinions were in effect, companies

could increase earnings per share just by issuing securities.

As a result of these Opinions, companies now must
adhere to two additional reporting requirements.

One,

earnings per share figures must be reported on the face of

the income statement where they are subject to the auditor’s
examination.

Two, there must be disclosure of the dilutive

effect of certain securities, such as convertible preferred

stock, convertible debentures, stock purchase warrants and
options.

It is this latter category of securities, sometimes
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referred to as "funny money,” that has been used so widely
in certain business combinations.

The Opinion requires

companies using this type of financing to report the

effects on their earnings per share.
Corporate annual reports for 1969 were greatly

improved because of these new reporting requirements.
The other major problem arising from the merger

movement lies in the accounting for a business acquisition.
The problem arises simply because the cost of an acquired

company differs from the amount of its net assets on its
own accounting basis.

But what to do with that difference

is among accounting’s most complex questions.

In most acquisitions the buyer has to pay more
for a company than the historical cost of the company’s

assets.

This excess cost may represent a variety of things

-- plant and equipment and other tangible assets which

are worth more than the seller’s recorded costs; trademarks,

processes and franchises which are carried by the seller at
little or no cost; and an unidentified intangible which,

for want of a better name, is called goodwill.

One might

think that costs of an acquired business would in some
manner be applied against future revenues before arriving

at net income.

But today’s accounting methods permit some

of these costs to elude income determination altogether.
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Present accounting permits the recording of an
acquisition as a purchase, a pooling of interests., or a

combination of the two.

Pooling of interests accounting

may be used only when a merger is made through the issuance
of voting stock.

On the other hand., purchase accounting

must be used when a company is acquired for cash, debt or

non-voting stock and may be used when a company is acquired
for voting stock.

In purchase accounting the acquired company's
identifiable assets should be stated at current fair values,

not at the values carried on the books of the acquired

However, often the amounts on the acquired com

company.

pany's books are simply carried over.

The excess of the

purchase price of the acquired company over the stated
amount of its net assets is designated as goodwill, which

may or may not be amortized against future income.

In

most instances, goodwill has not been amortized, because

managements normally like to avoid a charge against income
if such avoidance is permissible under generally accepted

accounting principles.

Goodwill amortization is especially

unpopular as it is not deductible for federal income tax
purposes.

In a pooling of interests, the book value of the

acquired company is simply added to the book value of the

buyer.

The amount paid in excess of book value is not

recognized as a cost.

Thus, the buyer may be able to show
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a large increase in earnings without being required to

reflect the true cost of obtaining those earnings.
Conditions today result in what might be called

"non-accounting" for business combinations.

Financial

statements reporting this type of transaction could be

misleading to the investing public.

This is because the

cost of an acquisition is partially suppressed by the

currently permitted pooling-of-interests concept; and
because the charge-off of goodwill is not now mandatory.
Quite obviously non-accounting produces higher future

earnings.
Other ploys used in this area result in what
some observers call "instant earnings."

For example, in

a pooling it is considered proper to combine earnings of

the acquired and acquiring company for all past periods.
An acquirer having a low profit year can acquire a pro

fitable company near the end of the year and report only
the combined result -- instant earnings.’

Or, an acquirer records the old historic cost
of an asset which has a much higher value today.

The asset

may be land, a film library, or a marketable security.
The acquirer may then sell the asset and add the difference

to its income even though it paid the full fair value of

the asset in the merger transaction -- instant earnings
again.’
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There are other frailties in today’s merger

accounting, but this brief sketch highlights some of the
major ones.

Leaders of the accounting profession are not

alone in their concern over this non-accounting.

Financial

analysts, credit grantors, investors and government agencies

have generally become alarmed.

A recent article in the

New York Times states:

"The wave of business acquisitions and mergers
in recent years has been furthered by loose
accounting principles and practices."
And Dr. Williard F. Mueller, former chief econo
mist of the Federal Trade Commission in a recent report

to the Senate

Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust and

Monopoly Legislation concluded, among other things:

"Accounting practices, as they have evolved
in the last two decades, have granted merger-minded
companies almost limitless opportunity to under
state the market value of investments in acquired

enterprises.

The suppression of true asset values

creates opportunities for acquiring companies
artificially to inflate reported profits.

As a re

sult investors are misled and merger activity is

encouraged.

Under present accounting rules, firms

expanding through merger have more leeway to manipulate

asset values and reported earnings than firms growing

internally."
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Perhaps the most insistent demands for steps to

correct the situation have come from the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Here’s what former SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen

said in October 1968, repeating earlier assertions of a
similar nature:
”.

. .there is an urgent need for a reexami

nation of the basic criteria established for

determining the applicability of purchase or pool
ing accounting in a combination.

These standards

have been seriously eroded over the years.

This

fact, along with the increased use of more complex

securities, and differing methods for dealing with

them, have brought distortions of the pooling con
cept beyond its original purpose.”
Current Chairman Hamer Budge has expressed his

concern over the problem and indicated that the urgency

of the situation would require rule-making by the Commission,
if the accounting profession did not act.
The Accounting Principles Board was in accord
with a broad public demand for action when it began develop

ing an Opinion on business combinations and intangible
assets.

In February 1970, after much deliberation, the

APB issued a draft Opinion on the subject.
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The Board’s tentative position calls for business
combinations to be accounted for by either the purchase or

pooling-of-interests method, but not as optional alternatives
for a given transaction.

The new rules refine both the

purchase and pooling methods, and establish criteria for

obligatory use of pooling.

All transactions not meeting

the criteria would have to be accounted for as purchases.

Further, the draft Opinion states that the cost of all
intangible assets acquired in a purchase should be recorded
and should be charged against income over the estimated

benefit period, but not to exceed forty years.
Among the more important conditions set forth in
the exposure draft for use of pooling-of-interests accounting

are:

.

.

. The voting common stock interest of each
combining company is at least one-third
that of each of the other parties to the
merger.

.

.

. The plan is carried out within one year
and is effected by issuing voting common
stock for substantially all of the voting
common stock interest of another company.

.

. A combining company, other than the one
issuing common stock to effect the com
bination, may pay only normal dividends
and reacquire only a normal number of
shares of common stock after the date the
plan of combination is initiated.

.

. The combination agreement does not provide
for (a) any future issuance of securities
or other consideration on the basis of

.
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some event or other contingency, or (b)
the direct or indirect retirement or re
acquisition of the common stock issued
to effect the combination.
.

. . The surviving combined corporation does
not plan to dispose of a substantial part
of the formerly separate companies within
two years.

In those situations qualifying for pooling treat
ment, the proposed Opinion says that a merger consummated

after the close of the acquirer’s fiscal year may not be
recorded as if completed prior to fiscal year end.
The draft Opinion further specifies that the cost

basis of intangible assets, including goodwill, be amortized
on a straight-line basis.

A method other than straight-line

may be used only when a corporation can demonstrate that

another systematic method is more appropriate.
that goodwill lasts indefinitely.

Some argue

But the draft Opinion

adopts the view that goodwill has an indeterminate life rather
than a perpetual life.

Therefore, some systematic method

of charging it to income is essential.

Some interesting accounting problems arise as a
by-product of the proposed Opinion.

One of them is the

method of determining a fair market value for securities in
situations where no established market exists or factors

make the quoted market value unrealistic.

This question is

not new to the accounting profession, but its importance

will be increased by the new emphasis to be placed on account

ing for mergers and acquisitions by the purchase method.
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Heretofore, with most acquisitions for voting

securities having been treated as poolings of interests,
it has been unnecessary to determine market value of

securities issued because this method recognizes only book

values.

Now, however, there will be many instances in

which voting securities will be used to acquire another
company, and purchase accounting will be required.

The draft Opinion outlined above has been distri

buted to over 50,000 persons in business, financial, academic
and accounting circles.

The exposure period ran from the end of February

through May 15, during which about 700 letters were received.

Predictably, a majority of the respondents opposed the

Board's proposal.

There was a stretch of eight days during

the exposure period when not a single letter came in opposing

the Board -- then the mail strike ended.
Opposing letters have been marked more by pungent

language than persuasive logic.

Many refer to economic

reality, saying the Board's proposal lacks it whereas present
accounting practices reflect it.

Others talk about the

"real world”, saying that any one who disagrees with them

is unaware of the real world.
Newspapers have quoted some of the more intemperate
comments.

One critic said about the Board, "They must be

smoking opium.” Another is quoted as having said, "The APB

is off its rocker."
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What makes critics behave this way?

No doubt

the reasons vary, and no doubt many of the critics are

sincere in their opposition to the Board on a conceptual
basis.

But the APB members are men of indisputable integrity,

probably as intelligent as their critics, and probably more
deeply knowledgeable of accounting theory and corporate fi

nancial reporting problems.

In addition, they certainly

have less bias than those in corporate management who oppose
reform and favor non-accountability.

Critics of the proposed Opinion have charged
that the Board is attempting to curb the merger movement

and is depriving the economy of the momentum provided by
the merger trend.

The fact is that the Board is neither

for nor against mergers.

The only concern it has in the

current merger movement is the manner in which business
combinations are reported.

Its objective is simply to

see that when mergers and acquisitions occur, they are

reported fairly to investors and the public.
With the emotion stripped away, many of those
who oppose the Opinion undoubtedly do so because it re

duces their options -- in more ways than one.

In addition to what can be regarded as spontaneous
opposition, there have been, as many of you are probably
aware, some rather highly organized

defeat the proposal.

campaigns to try to
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For example, the Financial Executives Institute

urged all its members to write to the APB in opposition.
And the FEI has (very belatedly it seems to me) authorised

a research study of accounting for acquisitions of companies
which were reported in the public press in 1967.

The re

search prospectus implies that its purpose is to demonstrate
the incorrectness of the APB’s exposure draft.

The FEI

also has written to members of several congressional com

mittees suggesting these areas are more appropriately left

to the legislative and regulatory functions of the Federal
Government.

An accounting firm has advised its clients of
the firm’s opposition to the APB proposal and has suggested
that they express their views to the APB.

Corporate managements have opposed it, too, some
darkly suggesting drastic actions to thwart the APB’s

efforts.

In a way, this is reminiscent of the income tax

Opinion of two and a half years ago (which drew about 1,000
comment letters), when the FEI, some accounting firms and

business managements were trying to block its issuance.
Nevertheless, the Opinion was issued.

Many companies have supplied multiple responses
to the business combinations proposal.
One of the most persistent fallacies in comments
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from those who oppose reform is the statement that the Board
is introducing new concepts.

This is not so.

Both purchase accounting and pooling-of-interests

accounting have been a part of the American Institute’s
authoritative literature for many years.

Purchase accounting

always has been absolutely essential for transactions in

volving cash or debt.

Allocating total cost to specific

assets has been a requirement too.

References can be found

in American Institute pronouncements dating back at least

to 1944.
Admittedly the purchase method has not always

been applied in the manner called for by the official pro
nouncements.

The complaints we hear today, then, seem

obviously to run to the expectation that a new pronounce

ment will be enforced.
Yet some opponents of reform would regress even
from the partial accountability we have today.

In a

commentary of one accounting firm, which it called a

"brief” and circulated to the press, the statement is
made that goodwill arising in a business transaction re

presents nothing more than stock market speculative values

even if the company is acquired for cash or debt!I

The

firm would then solve this problem by reducing capital

by the amount of the goodwill, thus avoiding accountability
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for the cash expended or debt incurred.

this reasoning is incredible.

To many accountants,

It would make just as much

sense to reduce capital accounts for the cost of a plant,
thereby avoiding future charges to income for depreciation.
But vehement opposition to higher and more uni

form accounting principles has never been characterized by
persuasive logic.

Pooling of interests accounting is not new and
neither is the concept of approximately equal size.

It

was first described in official literature in 1950.

It

is well known that a limit on relative size has not been

followed in recent years, but this is scarcely an argument
against the logic of the concept.

It simply indicates the

natural tendency to follow a path of permissiveness.

Now

opposition is intense because machinery exists for enforce

ment .
Many critics have complained that a 3 to 1 size
test for using pooling-of-interests method is discriminatory.
This is not so.

It would apply to all companies and is

simply a dividing line for determining whether the criterion
of approximate equality has been met.

Accounting pronounce

ments ought to have specific guidelines for their imple

mentation.

Without this degree of specificity, it Would

surely be difficult to apply the rules fairly and uniformly.
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One of the efforts of critics has been to attempt

to demonstrate that the Board’s proposal would result in
large amounts of amortization of goodwill, which would
greatly reduce post-merger earnings and thereby make

what was an economically sound transaction look unprofitable.
It matters little whether the example used for
illustration applies purchase accounting to an actual trans

action, which was in fact accounted for as a pooling, or
to a hypothetical transaction, a combination of General
Motors and IBM being a favorite.

But either due to lack

of knowledge or intent to obfuscate, these people ignore

the fact that the deal would be different when and if the
accounting rules are made different.

A company would not pay as much for another com

pany if the full cost had to be accounted for.

Typically,

the practitioners of this sleight-of-hand overlook the
probability that some of the excess cost over underlying

book values would be attributable to specific assets, such
as plant, inventories, marketable securities, patents and
processes.

Proper accounting for the cost of these pur

chased assets would in all likelihood leave a much smaller
amount for goodwill.

Another common complaint of critics is that good
will cannot be amortized for tax purposes; therefore it
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should not be amortized for financial reporting purposes.
Tax accounting is not controlling for financial reporting
purposes in most areas, and there is little logic

in asserting tax accounting to be preferable here.
This fact that amortization of goodwill is hot

deductible for Federal income tax purposes is a main

reason that the proposed Opinion is especially unwelcome

to businessmen.

For many years, the American Institute

of CPAs has been urging the Treasury department to make
deductible for tax purposes goodwill arising from taxable
transactions.

Required amortization of goodwill for finan

cial reporting purposes may strengthen the argument for
its tax deductibility.

There is no one answer to the merger accounting
problems that will satisfy all -- no irrefutable logic,

no totally consistent method.

The APB proposal is not

the only reasonable and respectable solution.

ever, the most likely one to emerge.

It is, how

It recognizes that

in most business combinations, one company acquires the
other.

It recognizes also the fundamental concept that

costs are determined by the value of the consideration

given or the liability incurred or, if stock is issued,
by the value of the assets received.
The opinion also recognizes that in stock trans

actions of companies of nearly equal size, there is a con

-21-

ceptual basis for asserting the combination is a pooling

of interests of the stockholders of the two companies.

In

cases like this, the practical problems of valuing the
assets of the acquired company often become very difficult.

But when there is a wide disparity in size, the pooling

concept becomes more difficult to justify and the problems
of applying purchase accounting are usually less difficult.
Therefore, the APB proposal makes an abundance

of sense, conceptually and practically.

For it recognizes

that the strengths in the pooling method lie in those cases
where the purchase method makes the least sense and is
difficult to apply.

And it recognizes that the purchase

method is most appropriate in cases where it is difficult
to sustain an argument for the pooling method.

One may wonder whether opposition to the APB

on business combinations will keep it from issuing a
final Opinion.

If this happens, I believe the abuses of

merger accounting will be curbed swiftly and sharply by

the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The opponents

then will not only have failed to preserve the advantages

they now see in today’s loose practices, but they will
have forced the transfer of an important

business function

from self-regulation to government regulation.

I believe, however, that the APB will issue
an opinion on business combinations that will greatly
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restrict use of the pooling of interests method and will

require amortization of goodwill that arises by using the

purchase method.
For one thing, the APB has a powerful ally in

the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Discussing the

draft Opinion before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly

Subcommittee, Chairman Budge said:
"If criteria such as these are adopted, the
use of pooling accounting for business
combinations will once again be confined
to those that reflect the true pooling con
cept, which will be few in number."
And he added that these restrictions as well as
others under consideration will (and I quote) "go far toward

removing ambiguity and uncertainty from financial re

porting. "

More recently, he appeared before the House Anti
trust Subcommittee and again supported the APB proposal.

Many other organizations, including the Financial

Analysts Federation, the New York Stock Exchange and the
American Stock Exchange, have indicated their substantial

agreement with the Board’s proposal.
Nor do all corporate managements believe that
accounting reform would be disastrous.

For example, the

executive vice president of a major manufacturing company
wrote:
"Apparently there is a concentrated effort
to get as many executives as possible to write
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you dissenting with the position taken in
the draft. These are self-serving and
reflect concern over the financial impact
on their company rather than a true re
flection on the accounting logic of the
Exposure Draft.
”ln my opinion, the draft establishes the
cost basis of an acquisition and properly
sets forth the method of accounting for
such cost.”

Another company, Boise Cascade Corporation, which
has expanded greatly

by mergers, noted in its 1969 annual

report, "Under their (American Institute of CPAs) proposal,
accounting for mergers as pooling of interests would be
applicable to very few situations.

We do not expect the

changes, if adopted and uniformly applied, to affect our

growth.

We have always looked to the business advantages

of proposed acquisitions rather than the form of the
accounting to be applied."
I do not mean to imply that Boise Cascade favors
the precise proposals in the exposure draft, but they cer

tainly have taken an enlightened view of accounting reform.
Their attitude stands out in stark contrast to

that of other acquisitive companies.

For example, one

determined corporate opponent hired a hall and held a
press conference to express its opposition.
Some corporate managements have threatened
legal action to stop the APB from making its Opinion

effective, and it is indeed possible that some would go

this far in trying to preserve the opportunity to acquire
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a business without accounting for its cost.

But I feel

bound to say that it would be a grave mistake for a cor
poration to misuse stockholders’ assets in pursuit of legal

action that could not possibly be sustained and could only

damage the corporate reputation.
The accounting profession is deeply committed to

the improvement of standards of corporate financial re
porting.

They are doing it fairly and impartially, for

uniform application throughout business.
public interest.

This is in the

But it is also in the best interests

of business management.

# # # ##

